Introduction
Franchising is an important tendency on business contracting, playing a special role in food sector. It is well know the function of franchising as a governance structure of transaction between franchisor and franchisee. As a result, franchising empirical studies have generally focused on forward coordination, relying on agency arguments (Dnes, 1996) . This paper, instead, investigates backward coordination, i.e., management of productive chain induced by food franchising.
The main hypothesis is founded on New Institutional Economics (NIE), particularly on Williamson (1991) . It is expected that choice of governance structure depends on quality strategy adopted by franchise chains. This is due to the fact that, under certain conditions, quality strategies involve a higher asset specificity or a greater degree of uncertainty. Hence, quality strategies may lead to adoption of hybrid forms, or even vertical integration, rather than spot markets. In order to test this hypothesis, this paper presents a discrete structural analysis of six franchising cases in Brazilian market: two fast food chains (Arby's and Habib's) and four coffee shops (Fran's Café, Café do Ponto, Café Pelé and Casa do Pão de Queijo).
The choice of franchise chains that operate in different markets was deliberate.
In the fast food market, franchise brand name -the main specific asset in franchising-is associated to a set of products that make up the menu offered. Conversely, coffee shop brand name is normally connected to a single product, depending on the competitive strategy adopted by the chain. Moreover, separating the study into different markets (fast food and coffee shop) allows for a distinction to be made among the types of inputs, that may require stricter control of supply chain. Differences in characteristics of coffee 2 business -both of product and consumer market -and of other inputs used by fast food chains allow to observe which elements are relevant to establish the link between quality strategies and shifts of transaction attributes.
The paper is organized into five sections, in addition to this introduction. In the next section the argument used throughout this text is developed, associating competitive strategies to different governance structures. Third section lists the contributions of literature to subject of franchising, particularly to its role in coordination of productive chains. The relationship between standardization -a characteristic commonly observed in food franchising -as well as the quality strategies used by chains, and the changes of transaction attributes throughout the supply chain are discussed. The fourth section discusses the principal results, from the point of view of a comparative analysis of the six case studies. Finally, the last section sets forth the main conclusions and prospects for future studies.
Quality strategies and vertical coordination
The choice of a mix of strategies often requires companies to reorganize the productive chain in which they operate, and may involve different governance structures.
This relation can occur directly, for instance, as in the case of a market foreclosure which may require vertical integration as a means to exert control over the market of rival companies (Hart & Tirole, 1990) . In other words, in this case, governance structure (vertical integration) is the starting point for the exercise of market foreclosure.
In the specific case of quality strategies, the starting point is some process of differentiation (vertical differentiation) or of market segmentation (horizontal differentiation), 1 which may involve greater difficulties in both forward and backward transactions of the productive chain. These difficulties, in turn, may require different governance structures to cope with possible hazards to which these transactions are subject. Therefore, in such a case, there is an indirect relation between competitive strategy and governance structures: the first may imply a modification of transaction attributes which, hence, may alter the governance structure suitable to regulate this new transaction.
How quality strategies in the food sector affect governance structure was discussed by Menard (1996: 162) , in the case of "high quality standard" in poultry industry, while Farina & Zylbersztajn (1997) discussed the case of gourmet coffees, and Brousseau & Codron (1998) covered the season fruit market. In short, quality strategies may impose two kinds of coordination problems: a) the need for control over those stages of the productive process that differ from the one in which the company normally operates; and b) difficulties involved in evaluating the information relevant to the process of purchasing inputs needed for production. To cope with each of these problems, it may be necessary to adopt governance structures that a) offer greater control over the steps of the productive process that were not, a priori, under the hierarchical command of the company implementing the quality strategy, or b) that allow for observation and evaluation of the information necessary for the transaction. 1 In this text, the strategy of differentiation, also called vertical differentiation (Tirole, 1989) , refers to the offer of a product or service generically preferred by consumers in relation to competing products. The market segmentation strategy, in turn, also known as horizontal differentiation, refers to the offer of a product or service preferred by a single group of consumers (a segment of the market) and may even be ignored by most consumers.
These two transactional problems that result from the adoption of quality strategies can be analyzed through the model developed by Williamson (1991) . The requirements of a product with precise quality specifications may imply increased specificity of the assets involved in the transaction. This may take on several forms, be it the physical characteristics of the raw material, with payback occurring only if it is destined to the company implementing the quality strategy, or be it a brand name specificity, which is usually associated to the efforts of advertising a high quality product to the consumer. In the specific case of the food sector which, normally, means experience goods or even credence goods, the quality strategy cannot dispense with some means of transmission of information to the consumer -through the establishment of a brand name, reputation or certification -which could not be acquired prior to the purchasing process. The higher specificity of assets resulting from a quality strategy requires a governance structure that provides greater control over the transaction, allowing for the cooperative adaptations required by the presence of specific assets.
In addition to the probable impact of quality strategies on asset specificity, uncertainty -another transaction dimensions -may grow since minor changes in the characteristics of products deriving from random disturbances are no longer tolerated.
Thus, the variance of an attribute of any product, such as size, delivery date, flavor, etc., may impose hazards on the transaction and demand greater control of the variability of this given characteristic. If, in addition to this, the measurement of these attributes is difficult, it is impossible to impose quality-contingent clauses that can be objectively observed in agreements. To deal with this problem, the parties may opt for the adoption of a stricter governance structure, such as hierarchy.
The relation between quality strategies and governance structure is clear in the food sector, but is certainly not restricted to it. The relation is stronger in this sector, particularly owing to the almost absolute presence of experience or even credence goods, which implies the existence of measurement problems. Moreover, the consumer is especially sensitive to variations in the attributes of food, be it due to food safety problems, be it due to the taste. The problem of a quality strategy is set: consumers who are quite sensitive to quality variations, facing products that are subject to problems connected to the evaluation of that quality. This situation, however, is insufficient to demand different governance structures that allow for control over the productive chain.
For the choice of governance structure to be affected, the quality of the product must depend on different stages of the productive chain. When the control needed to allow for cooperative adjustments (required due to the presence of specific assets), or the reduction of variance of the product attributes (required due to the higher sensitivity to uncertainty) go beyond the productive stages contiguous to a company, there must be a coordinate effort in the productive chain and not just in the forward and backward transactions. This being the case, a quality strategy can lead to a series of governance structures that ensure the necessary control of the productive. This articulated set of governance structures is called a strictly coordinated subsystem (Zylbersztajn & Farina, 1998 ). An example of such a situation is the case of supermarkets operating in the segment of fine meats. It is not only necessary to use hybrid forms for the purchase of this product from slaughter houses but also the latter requires contracts to guarantee the purchase of live cattle that meet the quality standard demanded by the supermarkets.
The next section presents some aspects of franchising, with emphasis on its role in the induction of governance structures which allow for the standardization required by its products.
Food franchises: forward and backward coordination
The objective of franchise agreements is the distribution of products, goods and/or services at given levels of standardization, quality, and regularity. The purpose of this position is to build a relationship of trust between franchise brand name and final consumer, regardless of geographical location of a given store. Brand name value is associated with the fact that consumers distinguish and prefer a product that carries a well-known trademark. The primary role of a brand name is the reduction of information costs about products, inasmuch as the consumer acquires, without any cost, part of the information relevant to the selection process. In other words, a brand name "serves to guarantee that the product is, and will remain, uniformly good" (Barzel, 1982: 36) .
Insofar as the value of a brand name depends on its capacity to transmit information, the absence of a standard may result in the brand name's depreciation. As a consequence, the experience of consumption of a product with characteristics differing from those transmitted by the brand name voids the latter's capacity to inform and, therefore, partially reduces its value. This aspect is particularly important in the case of franchises because the brand name and business format are key elements for contracting and the geographically dispersed production makes standardizing their products a complex endeavor.
Brand name is one of the most important specific assets identified in a franchising, which is why problems related to its use may lead to losses throughout the chain. From this standpoint, it is essential for the success of the franchise chains to have an effective forward coordination aimed at strengthening the brand name by smoothing out problems related to franchising (one sided moral hazard).
Search for valuation of franchised brand name simply through forward coordination may not, however, be enough in many cases. This is because building up a trust relationship between franchise brand name and consumer will depend on the efficiency of chains in promoting the commercialization of their products in a regular manner, in terms of quality, quantity and periodicity. Hence, the valuation of a brand name is also related to the efficiency of food franchising in their backward coordination,
i.e., in their supply systems, in order to meet the specifications demanded by consumers.
This fact takes on greater importance in the adoption of competitive strategies, such as market segmentation and product differentiation.
Market segmentation in coffee market can be implemented, for example, through the supply of different blends, degrees of roasting or grinding, aimed at specific consumer niches such as flavored coffees, coffees for domestic coffeemakers, espresso, decaffeinated or special blends. Product differentiation, on the other hand, when associated to a brand name, for instance, represents another competitive strategy. Thus, as a fast food franchise invests in its brand name to disseminate and consolidate highly standardized top quality products, the company will have to guarantee stability and regularity of its supply in line with standards identified and valued by its consumers.
It is, therefore, a gradual process of gaining consumer preference, whose fidelity will depend on the capacity of franchise chains to guarantee a regular supply, in line with the quality and standardization patterns connected to the strategies adopted.
In this sense, investments made in competitive strategies can be lost if raw materials are inadequately supplied. Such would be a case of irrecoverable loss of investments owing to its specificity. Vertical integration or contracting would then offer effective solutions (Farina & Saes, 1997: 219 -220) .
Given the relationship between standardization and brand name value, one can consider that products sold by food franchises that require greater control are those that are directly associated to the brand name. This explains the fact that fast food establishments require that all products sold by chain be standardized while, in the case of coffee shops, higher standardization is needed only for coffee, with the remaining products (pies, cakes, etc.) varying to a certain degree.
Finally, the standardization required for consumption experience to confirm the information transmitted by the brand name is not necessarily objective. It is enough that the consumer perceives the standard. If the consumer is insensitive to small variations in quality attributes, there is less need for objective standardization and, thus, for greater control over the transaction.
In this context, based on distinct strategies of fast food chains and coffee shops, coupled with differences identified in the transactions attributes and their respective institutional environments, this paper makes a comparison between the forms of coordination employed by both these segments, as shown in the next section. In face of problems identified in agri-chain management, to which the difficulty of being inserted in a new market could be added, Arby's has established itself successfully in Brazil by means of effective coordination of its productive chains.
In accordance with the strategies observed in the fast food segment, Arby´s seek to coordinate its supply chain in order to differentiate its brand name by means of a direct association to high levels of standardization and quality of all products, regardless of geographical location of any unit.
Even taking into account that many of the products sold by the chain may require highly specific transactions because they are related to the franchised brand name or because they represent products developed exclusively, Arby's makes use of only contractual supply agreements, and not even its distribution center is vertically integrated. That is, for example, the case of its roast beef supplied by Sadia (a food processing company), which required about one year of research in the development of a product that would meet Arby's international standard.
Since asset specificity goes beyond transactions linked directly to Arby's, the strict coordination of the productive chain, exclusively by means of its hybrid governance structure, has contributed to the development of strictly coordinated subsystems.
The higher asset specificity, related mainly to products developed exclusively for Arby's, requires the establishment of idiosyncratic contracts. Consequently, since parties operate within a relationship of bilateral dependence, hold-up would result in financial losses for both Arby's, which would face problems related to regularity of its consumer products that would directly impact the franchised brand name, and the supplier, faced with specific investments.
Habib's
Brazilian fast food chain Habib's, which began as a store selling Arab specialties, One of Habib's goals is to ally the quality of its products and services to attractive prices. In response to this strategic position, it is possible to identify the direct action of the chain in the coordination of several agri-systems, favoring the emergence of strictly coordinated subsystems, through hybrid and hierarchy governance structures of a significant part of inputs needed.
Habib's bread (hamburger, Syrian bread and pizza), cheese and ice cream production are vertically integrated, with production centers for each of these products.
Moreover, the chain also has other six vertically integrated units, called "central kitchens". Characterized by a variety of distribution centers identified at the remaining franchise chains, the central kitchens also process the raw materials destined for the stores.
According to Habib's, the advantages of relying on a hierarchy structure is the guaranteed standard, quality control and, principally, reliability of the supply system.
However, these advantages could be obtained by adequate incentives of possible partners, as was done by Arby's. Depending on transactional characteristics identified, adequate motivation could be achieved by the establishment of idiosyncratic agreements, reducing the costs incurred by the adoption of a rigid governance structure such as vertical integration.
The main distinction between the transactions observed in the two fast food chains is not in asset specificity, but in uncertainty. When Arby's began operating in Brazil, the American chain had a set of products and a business format already tested in other markets, while Habib's launched new products and, therefore, there was not the same degree of certainty regarding the venture success. As a consequence, it was possible to identify, in the first case, partners interested in investing in specific assets needed to supply products to Arby. On the other hand, when it began its operations, Habib's did not appear to represent the business stability required to support a hybrid governance structure. This point is discussed further in the next section, which deals with the main results.
Habib's chose, at the time, to act directly in the industrialization of these raw materials, making alterations that were limited by the existence of sunk costs to define more suitable governance structures to minimize transaction costs. Thus, the current coordination mechanism used by Habib's is better explained by path dependence.
Fran's Café
Brazilian coffee shop chain Fran's Café, founded in 1972, only became structured on franchising in 1992. By the end of 1998 the chain had 50 franchised units and 8 own stores.
Fran's Café is the only chain, among the coffee shops considered in this paper, that opted for product differentiation, focusing its attention on high-income consumers. This strategy seeks brand name differentiation by a direct association with comfort and refined atmosphere of its units, besides personalized service.
This strategy, even considering more select consumers, can be better explained by low sensitivity level of Brazilian consumer in regard to extreme quality coffee, as opposed to American and European markets. Hence, even high-income consumers seeking a product with given quality specifications do not appear to be sensitive to subtle variations in quality of coffee beans. In face of this fact, the differentiation strategy turned to the environment of consumption -comfortable, refined and with personalized service -maintaining the quality of its coffee beans at levels similar to those of other coffee shops.
Regardless of the input, Fran's Café structures its supplies in contractual relationships, such as the supply of its exclusive coffee blend, through idiosyncratic contracts. Coffee bean processor that supplies its blend, however, follows the standard supply policy of coffee market, i.e., it purchases coffee beans on the spot market. As a result, there is no strict control over the quality of coffee beans, but only over the blend used.
As identified at other chains, in addition to coffee and "pão de queijo" (cheese bread rolls), 2 in face of high synergy involved in the sale of these products, the chain does not have a standardized menu and each franchisee may, according to availability and local preferences, choose the most suitable variety of products as well as of supply forms.
Café do Ponto
Brazilian chain Café do Ponto began its activities in 1950, with commercialization of roasted coffee beans. Since then, the chain has stood out for diversification of its activities, operating in several stages of the coffee business. In 1976, seeking to disseminate its brand name throughout the country, Café do Ponto began operating directly in coffee shop segment, based on market segmentation strategy and covering all consumer classes.
The success of this strategy favored the licensing of the brand name throughout the country culminating, in 1992, in its expansion through franchising. Nowadays, Café do
Ponto has over 200 stores spread all over the country, consisting of 9 own units, 92
franchised and 100 licensed units, also called first generation franchising. The chain also has four stores abroad, located in Paraguay.
Despite its different performance in the coffee shop segment -responsible for both franchising and its own coffee supply -Café do Ponto holds a strategic market position.
Thus, the chain does not differentiate the quality of the product itself, seeking only to differentiate the refinement of its establishments, quality of services rendered to consumer, as well as the range of products it offers, for instance, the sale of espresso, instant coffee, decaffeinated, cappuccino coffee, and roasted and ground coffee for home consumption.
As beans attributes do not play a key role in its quality strategy, Café do Ponto supply itself through spot market. Thus, following a pattern identified in this segment, Café do Ponto, with the exception of the supply of its coffee and cheese bread rolls, does not have a standard menu, preferring to simply inform its units regarding the most suitable products to sell.
Café Pelé
Brazilian coffee shop chain Café Pelé, founded in 1992, was structured on franchising in 1994 and had 32 franchised units in 1998. Since it began its operations, Café Pelé has had a contractual relationship established between the coffee roaster Café
Cacique and the espresso coffee machine dealer Grão Expresso. Hence, while the roaster is responsible for guaranteeing the supply and maintenance of the quality levels agreed on, the objective of its partner, Grão Expresso, is to control and exploit franchising.
Following the strategy employed by Café do Ponto, Café Cacique's performance in coffee shop segment represents the company's goal to strengthen its link with Brazilian consumer. The reason for this is that, although the chain acts nationwide, its activities are directed at exports of instant coffee, basically to major wholesalers located in Western Europe. Thus, the roaster has opted for the dissemination of his principal brand name, Café Pelé, sold on the domestic retail market.
Café Pelé, like other coffee shops, does not base its quality strategies on the quality of its coffee beans, owing to Brazilian consumer's lack of sensitivity in identifying minor variations in beans' attributes. Nonetheless, there is concern regarding homogenization of the coffee blend used, as well as the supply of cheese bread rolls. In regard to the remaining items sold, franchisees enjoy total freedom both to decide on the extent of their menus and on the supply forms used.
Casa do Pão de Queijo
The history of Brazilian chain Casa do Pão de Queijo began in the 1930s, but was only restructured into franchise format in 1987. Currently, the chain has 195 units franchised throughout Brazil.
Casa do Pão de Queijo fits into coffee shop segment because, although its brand name is associated to the well known cheese roll, it is a product that is consumed as a complement to coffee. This is the reason why the chain does not have an exclusive supplier for its espresso coffee, which varies according to the market that each unit caters to. Thus, Casa do Pão de Queijo, by associating the sale of its exclusive cheese bread rolls to a range of possible complementary products, allows the franchisee to chose both the extent of the menu and supplies forms. At the same time, it becomes clear that the production of cheese bread rolls, as well as sweet and savory pastries, is vertically integrated.
It remains to be mentioned that, as in the case of Habib's, Casa do Pão de Queijo could use idiosyncratic contracts, which would reduce the costs incurred by the adoption of a rigid governance structure such as vertical integration. However, the difficulty of identifying partners interested in sharing initial plans for expansion of the chain activities in national market at that time ended up leading to the production of the cheese bread rolls itself.
Main Results
This section is dedicated to a discrete comparative analysis of the case studies presented in the previous section, dividing the main results of the article into three main categories to explain the choice of governance structures used for the purchase of supplies of franchise chains: a) specific brand name assets, b) quality strategies in franchises, and c) historical elements.
The main reference for the analysis of results is the role of franchises in inducing governance structures focusing on management of the supply chain. The demand for standardization that was found for the final products may imply changes in transaction attributes and, as a consequence, in the choice of governance structures used by the franchise chains. The discussion then shifts to the different quality strategies employed by the franchise chains, seeking to define their effect on the choice of governance structure.
Brand name specific assets
The brand names used by franchises that were analyzed differ in their essence.
On one hand, the fast food chains have the value of their brand name associated to a set of products that make up their complete menu. Taking Arby's as an example, although its brand name is basically related to roast beef, the characteristics of other products such as salads are part of the set of information that is transmitted to the consumer by the chain's brand name, i.e., they are an integral part of the brand name's value. As such, not only the roast beef but also a wide range of products requires standardization. On the other hand, the brand names used in coffee market, in the case of this study, Café do Ponto, Fran's Café and Café Pelé, have their value associated to a single product: coffee, while the value of the brand name of Casa do Pão de Queijo lies in its main product:
cheese bread rolls.
Since the specific brand name asset requires the standardization perceived by the consumer, at the risk of losing the value of the brand name if it does not play its fundamental role of transmitting the expected information about experience goods, the purchase of raw materials must be controlled. However, due to brand name specificity, it is only necessary to use a governance structure that ensures control over the purchase of raw materials if these are directly related to the brand name. Thus, we expect that coffee shops strictly coordinate only their purchase of coffee blends from the roasters, allowing for variability of the remaining products sold by their franchised units but not directly associated to their brand names, such as pastries, pies, etc. This assumption is strongly confirmed by our empirical analysis since, while the two fast food chains in this study use hybrid or even hierarchical structures to purchase their raw materials, coffee shops use these governance structures only for their purchases of coffee blends or cheese bread rolls.
It should be pointed out that although the purchase of cheese bread rolls is carried out by means of contracts for the coffee shops whose brand names are associated to coffee, hierarchy is the solution used by the Casa do Pão de Queijo, indicating a greater need for control when the raw material is specific to the brand name. It is also worth noting that the supply agreements for cheese bread rolls used by the coffee shops are not idiosyncratic, since the three franchises analyzed in this study use the same supplier. This demonstrates that, in the case of the coffee shops whose brand names are associated to coffee, any possible product differentiation could not be based on cheese bread rolls.
Quality strategies
In addition to the perceived standardization demanded by the brand name, franchise chains may use different quality strategies that, in turn, may require different governance structures. In order to summarize the information obtained from the case studies, Figure 1 highlights the strategy employed by each franchise chain and the corresponding governance structure it uses to purchase its supplies.
The first issue to be explored is the use of the differentiating strategies found at Arby's, Habib's and Fran's Café, which lead to different governance structures in each of those cases. While Arby's uses only hybrid forms, Habib's also makes use of vertical integration and Fran's Café has idiosyncratic agreements only for purchases of its exclusive blend. Also, the roaster purchases coffee beans on the spot market. The differences between Arby's and Habib's are better explained by the argument developed in the next section, which leads us to postpone the answer. In regard to this point, it
should be explained why the same differentiating strategy led to different governance structures.
The relation between quality strategies and governance structures depends on three factors, as discussed in section 2: difficulties involved in measuring, consumer sensitivity to variations in product attributes, and the fact that required quality depends on other stages of the productive process. In the case of Arby's, these three conditions are met, i.e., its products are typically experience goods, slight variations in product attributes are perceived by its consumers, and the quality of the final product depends on the actions of its suppliers, as in the case of Sadia, which is responsible for producing Arby's roast beef. Contrary to Arby's, Fran's Café does not present two of the factors that induce the choice of a governance structure that allows for greater control. On one hand, it is not differentiated by the quality of the beverage but by the refined atmosphere available to the consumer. As a consequence, the quality of the final product (the consumption environment) is already under the control of the franchise chain, without the need for qualifications for cooperative backward adaptations of the productive system. On the other hand, owing to the many years of regulations governance the coffee market that effectively discouraged companies from using differentiation strategies (Farina & Saes, 1997) , the Brazilian consumer has not developed the sensitivity needed to identify subtle variations in product quality. Since slight variations in the quality of coffee beans are tolerated (some standardization is perceived), strict control over the supply chain is unnecessary. This last argument is the reason why all the franchise chains coordinate their purchase of coffee beans via the spot market, regardless of the strategy adopted. 
Historical elements
Differently from the other chains, two of the franchises analyzed -Habib's and Casa do Pão de Queijo − present a strictly controlled process of supply using vertical integration. The transaction attributes, when compared to the remaining chains, do not justify the adoption of an organizational form of extreme control, which may involve several costs, such as low capacity to exploit large-scale economies and loss of market incentives. In face of these facts, it is suggested that the governance structure adopted does not prove to be effective in reducing static transaction costs. In fact, the current configuration of the productive chain is better explained by historical elements, more precisely from the moment of implementation of franchising. Unlike Arby's that, from the start of its operations in Brazil, already constituted a successful business format (including a tested menu, established brand name, etc.), Habib's was a small company devoid of any reputation, whose product line was still unknown in the market. In other words, the uncertainty surrounding Habib's business, at the time that franchising was implemented, was substantially different from what it is today and from what Arby's business was like.
The effect of uncertainty on the process of selection of organizational forms has received increasing attention in the literature. On the case of Japanese companies, Aoki (1990) suggests that uncertainty leads not only to higher transaction costs but also these effects are considerably different according to the governance structure adopted. The increased number of unforeseen contingencies, given the specificity of assets, implies higher costs in the hybrid forms, in which the process of adaptation is decentralized although the parties are contractually linked, which does not occur in the case of spot market. Moreover, solutions for unforeseen contingencies must be reached by mutual consent of the parties, which is certainly more complex than exerting the direct authority offered by a hierarchical form. In short, uncertainty is associated to a broader use of polar market forms and hierarchy and to a lesser use of hybrid forms. Indeed, empirical tests correlating uncertainty to vertical integration have proven to be robust (Fan, 1995) .
Implementation of franchising at Habib's was, therefore, carried out within a context of uncertainty in regard to the success of the business. The consequence for the company was the difficulty involved in finding suppliers willing to run the risks inherent in a new company, which, moreover, required specific investments. The solution chosen was, therefore, vertical integration.
The company's current configuration can be interpreted as being a case of path dependence, inasmuch as the investments made by the company are typically sunk costs, which do not allow for their reallocation for other purposes.
Conclusions
The evolution of franchising, particularly in the food sector, is a phenomenon the consequences of which should go beyond the process of distribution and sale to the final consumer (forward coordination). Inasmuch as the quality strategies used by franchise chains may require the establishment of more rigid governance structures, reorganization in the supply chains of the main raw materials is to be expected in the wake of franchising.
Based on a multi-case study, this article sought to define what the necessary conditions are for quality strategies, particularly those used in the franchise system, to involve changes in governance structures. The main predictions established by the New Institutional Economics were confirmed by the empirical analysis, i.e., greater asset specificity and higher levels of uncertainty are associated to governance structures that provide stronger control over transactions. Among the specific assets identified, the one that proved to be common to all the chains and which is strongly associated to the backward coordination used by the chains was the brand name. Only raw materials having a considerable effect on the standardization demanded by the brand name required a governance structure that allowed for greater control over transactions. In addition, we were able to define that the standardization required by the franchises depends on consumer sensitivity to variations of product attributes, which suggests the use of the concept of standardization perceived by the consumer. In other words, if the consumer does not identify minor variations in product quality, it is unnecessary to strictly control the transactions, since the brand name continues to transmit the information of product or service standards.
Some of the results, however, are better explained by historical elements together with the manifestation of path dependence deriving from the existence of sunk costs.
When a company seeks to expand its activities through the franchise system, but there are not enough signs regarding the degree of success of the business, this leads to an environment of greater uncertainty which, in turn, may lead to vertical integration of the production of key inputs. As the business grows, the company gives signs of greater
